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Abstract
Collective action problems are a unique family of puzzles in ethics about what 
people do together. These puzzles pervade our modern and globalized world. In collective 
harms, individual actions lead to a serious moral wrong; yet, the individual actions 
themselves do not seem to be moral wrongs. In collective benefits, individual actions fail 
to bring about some serious moral good; yet, these individual actions do not seem to be 
morally wrong. In this paper, I will explore three different ways of grounding reasons 
why we ought not participate in the production of collective harms (or, refrain from 
producing a collective benefit). I argue that consequentialism fails to ground these 
reasons because it has problems in moral mathematics. I argue that deontological theories 
also fail to ground these reasons, because of problems with group actions. Finally, I 
conclude that contract theories provide the best way to make sense of these problems, and 
ground reasons why we ought not (or ought) to participate in the creation of collective 
harms (or benefits).
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Section 1: Introducing the Problem of Collective Action
There is a family of puzzles in ethics that are commonly referred to as collective 
action problems. In these cases, a group of people together cause some great harm. 
However, the actions undertaken by individuals in the group do not seem to be morally 
wrong. Certainly, many moral issues today take this form. For example, imagine a city 
with a large car-commuter population. Air pollution in the city is a collectively-caused 
harm; that is, it is a major harm caused by many people's acts in combination. However, 
individual acts of driving to work, which contribute to air pollution, do not seem to be 
morally wrong. There are also cases where individuals fail to produce collective benefits. 
For example, if enough people donated money to Oxfam, we could save the lives of 
many people suffering from malnutrition. However, individual failures to donate to 
Oxfam do not seem to be morally reprehensible. The reason these cases are puzzling is 
that there is a disconnect between individual acts, which seem to be of no moral 
significance, and the morally significant outcomes they collectively bring about.
Some people have the opinion that contributing to collective harms is not morally 
wrong. In fact, this seems to be a common viewpoint. For various reasons, these people 
argue that so long as individual acts are permissible, whatever collective harms they may 
cause are not relevant. However, I (and others) have the intuition that contributing to 
collective harms is morally wrong. Attempts have been made within various ethical 
viewpoints to arrive at this conclusion. While these puzzles are mainly problematic for 
consequentialists (ethical theorists who hold that the moral rightness or wrongness of an 
action is based on its consequences), this problem manifests in different ways in other 
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ethical frameworks as well. In this essay, I will survey attempts from various ethical 
frameworks to explain why contributing to collective harms (and/or failing to achieve 
collective benefits) is wrong, and explore what justifications these solutions have. In 
looking for a solution to this puzzle, I am concerned with whether or not some approach 
can condemn contributions to collective harms, and whether or not the explanation of this 
moral wrong is plausible. It is not only important that it be possible to reach this 
conclusion, but that we must do so in the right way.
In this essay, I argue that consequentialism cannot provide a satisfactory 
explanation of why contributing to collective harms is wrong. I also argue that most 
deontological theories fail to provide satisfactory explanations. A deontological theory of 
group agency comes close to resolving this problem, but contract theories provide the 
best answer. Contract theories provide a straightforward and intuitive answer as to what 
makes participating in a collectively-caused harm wrong.
Section 2: Building a Case Against Consequentialism
Consequentialism is the most initially intuitive framework to use in order to explain 
what makes contributions to collective harms wrong. Consequentialism is an ethical 
framework that holds that the rightness and wrongness of actions is based on the 
consequences those actions have. Utilitarianism is one branch of consequentialism, which 
elaborates on this central idea to say that acts which have the consequence of producing 
happiness or pleasure are the right actions, and those that have the consequences of 
causing harm or displeasure are the wrong actions. The reason that this looks like a 
promising ethical framework is because there is a strong intuition that what is wrong 
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about collective harms is that the harm was caused by agents and their actions. To 
illustrate this, consider an example created by Shelly Kagan. Imagine a fishing village 
that depends on a nearby lake for its livelihood. “We can imagine that if each fisher 
restricts their catch to a given, fixed number of fish, the small but stable fish population 
in the lake will be able to reproduce and sustain itself, and the village’s lifestyle can 
continue indefinitely. Furthermore, however many fish are taken, one fish more or less 
would not make a difference to the ability of the fish to successfully reproduce. But if 
several dozen people take an extra fish each, the fish population will crash, and the 
villagers will all suffer” (Kagan, 110). There is a close connection between the few extra 
fish taken (an act) and the destruction of the fishery (the consequence). Consequentialism 
should be able to explain why acts of overfishing are wrong.
However, explaining the wrongness of these actions is not as easy a task as it may 
seem. Consider another of Kagan’s examples. Imagine that we run a factory that releases 
some toxins into the air through a smokestack as a byproduct of production. Next 
“imagine that the smokestack is sufficiently tall that the pollutants are swept up into the 
stratosphere, where they are so scattered by the winds that when the toxins do come back 
down to the surface of the earth, they are spread over a very wide area— indeed, spread 
so thin that no single individual ever breathes in more than a single molecule from my 
plant.” Let us stipulate that one molecule is so small that it makes no difference to a 
person's health. But, because there are thousands of other such factories, many people do 
take in enough toxins to become ill (Kagan, 108-111). The factory owners fail an 
important test of causation introduced by Russ Shafer-Landau called the counterfactual 
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test of causation. He writes “some event is causally efficacious only if, had it not 
occurred, an outcome would not have occurred just as it did” (Shafer-Landau, 86). We 
can run this test on any individual factory owner. If this factory owner had acted 
differently, that is, not polluted, the outcome would still be the same: many people would 
have gotten sick. This means that the individual factory owner could not have caused the 
outcome. Because consequentialism grounds moral wrongness in the consequences of 
actions, it cannot condemn the action of the individual factory owner. Yet, the factory 
owners together make many people sick.
I have the intuition that the individual factory owners have done something wrong, 
and I have this intuition at least in part because it seems that the factory owner did make 
some sort of difference to the outcome in which many people became sick. After all, if 
each factory owner's molecule of pollution made literally zero difference to anyone's 
health, then nobody would become sick, no matter how many molecules accumulated in 
their bodies. We can call these kinds of claims 'make no difference' claims1. But there are 
two senses in which the ‘make no difference’ kind of claims can be true. In what we 
might call ‘weaker’ make no difference claims, what we mean is that the individual 
makes a very small, perhaps imperceptible difference to a final outcome. In ‘stronger’ 
make no difference claims, what is meant is that the action makes literally no difference 
to the final outcome2. Some people claim that consequentialism cannot explain what 
makes either a strong or weak contribution to a collective harm wrong, and conclude that 
1 As far as I can tell, Johnathan Glover coined this phrase in his article “It Makes No Difference Whether 
Or Not I Do It,” 1975
2 This 'stronger' and 'weaker' distinction is based on Glover's original “no difference” and “insignificant 
difference” distinction, but uses Shafer-Landau's terminology, as it appears in “Vegetarianism, 
Causation, and Ethical Theory,” 1994
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some sort of non-consequentialist theory would be best. But I do not think this is the right 
way to proceed. For one, the form of consequentialism I have presented above is a straw 
man: no consequentialist philosopher would actually endorse such a careless account of 
consequentialism. So, we will turn our attention to consequentialist philosophers who 
have attempted to resolve the problem presented above, and to the challenge posed by 
both kinds of ‘make no difference’ cases. Most proposals are based on the idea that what 
has gone wrong in the above cases is that we have failed to do our utilitarian calculation 
correctly. These accounts will differ with respect to what feature of the moral landscape 
they argue we are failing to account for. Other proposals look at the expected utility of 
actions. Still others turn to rule utilitarianism. In the following section, I will explore each 
of these proposals in turn.
A chapter of Derek Parfit's 1984 book "Reasons and Persons" has sparked much of 
the discussion on this subject. Chapter 3 of this book is called "Five Mistakes in Moral 
Mathematics." In this chapter, Parfit explains five mistakes that people commonly make 
when making consequentialist calculations. He argues that if we adjust our 
consequentialist reasoning so as not to make these mistakes, we will get the right answer 
in collective action type cases.
The first of these mistakes is called the “share of the total view.” On this view, 
whenever there is a collective action, each agent "produces his share of the total benefit" 
(Parfit, 68). So, if four of us together save the lives of 100 people, the share of the total 
view says we are each responsible for saving 25 lives. Parfit shows that this view is 
mistaken because it has bad implications. For example, suppose that I could save 100 
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people as a collective action with 4 other people. Suppose also that, at the same time, I 
could go elsewhere and save 3 lives. There is someone else who could take my place as 
part of the group of four, but who could not save the other lives. The share of the total 
view implies that I should take part in the rescue mission in which I save 25 lives, and let 
3 needlessly die, because doing so maximizes my share of the total lives I save. If this 
argument is convincing, we should agree that the share of the total view is mistaken.
The second mistake in moral mathematics is that it is wrong to think "if some act is 
right or wrong because of its effects, the only relevant effects are the effects of this 
particular act" (Parfit, 70). This is to say that it is wrong to consider only "the effects 
single acts," because this act could be "one of a set of acts that together harm other 
people" (Parfit, 70). Or, we could be part of some group whose actions together harm or 
benefit some people. Take the example of watering my lawn in a drought. In order to 
avoid making the second mistake, I must also consider the other acts of 'lawn-watering' 
done by others, because our acts together might create a water shortage.
The third mistake is related to the second. It says that it is a mistake to "ignore very 
small chances when they would either affect very many people, or would be taken very 
many times" (Parfit, 75). The case of voting in a large scale election is a good way to 
illustrate this principle. There is a very small chance that a single vote in the election will 
make a difference- where making a difference means swinging the outcome of the 
election in favor of one candidate over another. But, we can assume that the outcome of 
an election will make a large difference to very many people, so the importance of the 
outcome multiplies the (otherwise small) chance that a vote will matter, so voting 
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becomes very important. 
The fourth and fifth mistakes have to do with the very small consequences of 
actions. Parfit argues that it is mistaken to think that "if some act has effects on other 
people that are imperceptible, this act cannot be morally wrong because it has these 
effects. An act cannot be wrong because of its effects on other people, if none of these 
people could ever notice any difference. Similarly, if some act would have imperceptible 
effects on other people, these effects cannot make this act what someone ought to do" 
(Parfit, 75). The fifth mistake differs from the fourth in that it replaces each instance of 
'imperceptible' with 'very small.' There is some debate as to whether there can be such 
things as 'imperceptible' harms and benefits. But if anyone has a problem with the fourth 
mistake, they can accept the fifth mistake instead.
The reason Parfit takes time to point out these mistakes is that he believes that if a 
consequentialist avoids making this mistakes, they will get correct answers about 
contributing to collective harms. I find Parfit's arguments somewhat convincing, but I 
also think that his discussion here raises more questions than it solves. For example, we 
should agree that the share of the total view is a mistaken view: we should not merely 
divide the total harm done by the number of people who produce it3. Parfit suggests that 
we should instead adopt some sort of 'whole of the total' view, in which each person 
counts as producing the whole of the total benefit (Parfit, 69). But this faces a few 
problems. First, the whole of the total view is not an intuitive way to describe the effects 
of actions. Using Parfit's example involving four people on a platform, the whole of the 
3 For another explanation as to why the 'share of the total view' is wrong, see Shafer-Landau, 
“Vegetarianism, Causation, and Ethical Theory,” 1994, p90-91. 
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total view would have us say that each person saved 100 lives. In a way, this seems false; 
what we want to say that each person saved 100 lives with the help of three others. The 
second problem with this revision is that it has no real justification other than that it gets 
the right answer in this specific case. Of course, Parfit is trying to argue against the share 
of the total view, and he is not attempting to provide a full-fledged argument in support of 
the whole of the total view. But I think we should put some pressure on what seems to be 
an ad-hoc solution.
We can put pressure on the second mistake as well by showing that it raises more 
problems than it solves. Even if we agree that the premise endorsed by the second 
mistake is, in fact, mistaken, we still have a lot of work to do in order to assess the 
boundaries of 'sets of acts' and 'groups of actors.' Let us return to the lawn-watering 
example. Because I want to avoid making the second mistake, in assessing the 
consequences of the act of watering my lawn, I must also look at whether or not my act 
would be part of a set of acts which together causes a water shortage. But in doing so, do 
I begin by looking at acts which share the same content (lawn-watering)? Or, do I look at 
any act that has the same outcome (water supply usage)? Depending on the details of the 
water reserves, there might be an important temporal element as well- imagine that the 
water supply is replenished every five years. If this is the case, the set of acts in question 
might include my act of lawn-watering today and someone's act of showering five years 
ago. Parfit does make a suggestion as to how we might be able to more carefully delimit a 
set of acts, but what I hope to have shown is that doing so will require some strong 
positive arguments that make sense of an otherwise vague but complicated idea.
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Parfit's arguments are closely related to those of Shelly Kagan's and Johnathan 
Glover's. These three philosophers have been engaged in an academic dialog about 
collective action problems for some time. Kagan's and Glover's proposals are within the 
same family as Parfit's because they are attempts to correct the way we do moral 
mathematics. But Kagan and Glover introduce an important distinction: they argue that 
cases of this sort can be sorted into two types of structures. In the first type of case, these 
is an "absolute threshold" or boundary between two different outcomes (Glover, 173). 
Kagan calls these 'triggering' cases, because while most acts make a very small 
difference, one action will 'trigger' a different outcome (Kagan, 118). The most common 
example of this type of case is voting. It is true that one vote can trigger a radically 
different outcome in an election between candidate A and B. The other type of structure is 
that of a "discrimination threshold." In these cases, "a single person's act will push a 
situation slightly further in a certain direction, but where his contribution, although real, 
may be too small to be detected when its effects are spread throughout the community" 
(Glover, 173). Kagan calls these 'imperceptible difference' cases instead. In these cases, 
there is no sharp trigger, and each act represents a push along the underlying dimension. 
Consider the collapse of a fishery. There is no single fish caught that serves as the trigger 
point between the fishery being 'healthy' and 'in decline.' Instead, there is some 
undetermined point at which the decline becomes noticeable to the fishermen. Kagan 
argues that "these two sorts of cases- imperceptible difference cases and triggering cases- 
are importantly different in terms of their underlying mechanisms, and thus require 
different analyses" (Kagan, 119). With this distinction in place, let's look at Kagan's and 
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Glover's accounts, beginning with Kagan. 
Kagan's main line of argument is to "take seriously the idea of looking to see what 
difference my individual act makes" (Kagan, 114). Kagan's account makes a conscious 
attempt to avoid making the fourth mistake in moral mathematics, in that it "insists that 
results need not be perceptible to be real, and they need not be perceptible to count 
morally" (Kagan, 114). Kagan is arguing that there are no such things as stronger 'make 
no difference' cases. “Make no difference" claims are, for Kagan, merely colloquial. In 
reality, all acts make a difference, and if we take small differences seriously, we can 
condemn participation in collective harms. 
First, let's consider what happens for Kagan in 'pure' triggering cases. Kagan admits 
that there is a very small chance that a given act will be the one that makes a big 
difference. For example, in the pollution case, assume that I operate one of a thousand 
other such factories like mine. Because of this fact, there is a very small (1/1000) chance 
that the molecule from my factory will be the one to make someone sick. But, Kagan 
argues, if the outcome is important enough, or if the outcome would affect very many 
people, we should not discount this chance. Using an appeal to expected utility, we 
should see that in these types of acts, where an act could trigger something very bad, the 
expected utility is negative. Thus, the straightforward consequentialist condemns these 
actions (Kagan, 129).
Now, let's look at how Kagan handles incremental difference cases. Kagan 
eventually concludes that cases of this sort are really just triggering cases in disguise 
(Nefsky 2011, 365). Kagan believes that there must always be some sort of triggering 
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action, otherwise the outcome would not change. He also concludes that "in some cases, 
there are many triggering acts, each making only a very small difference to the overall 
outcome," and in others, "only a few triggering acts, each making a large difference" 
(Kagan, 140). In order to illustrate this point, he develops a case involving purchasing 
chickens from the store. For brevity, I will summarize the important details from the final 
form it takes. Suppose that chickens are sold in cases of 25. For every 25 chickens sold, 
the butcher makes a note. At the end of the day, he calls the farmer and tells him how 
many more chickens to begin raising, in order to keep up with demand. Each consumer 
makes an incremental difference to the number of cases ordered, and the person who 
orders the 25th chicken triggers the next case order. However, if someone purchases the 
third or 24th chicken in the box, they do not trigger the purchase of another 25 chickens. 
But of course, the consumers are unaware of what number their chicken is: "I may not 
know what the actual triggering number, T, is, but I do know that I have a 1 in T chance 
(more or less) of being part of a cohort that triggers an increased order, and that if I am 
part of such a cohort then another T chickens (more or less) will suffer. The net expected 
utility of my act of purchasing a chicken is negative, and so the consequentialist 
condemns it" (Kagan, 127). Once again, we use the 'familiar consequentialist tool' of 
expected utility in order to explain why the acts of chicken-purchasing are wrong.
The most important take-away from Kagan is that he thinks all collective action 
problems have some kind of triggering structure. Since triggering cases are already well-
handled by appealing to expected utility, collective action problems are really not a 
puzzle for consequentialists after all (Kagan, 140).  What is wrong with participating in 
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the causation of collective harms, like the harm that results from very many people 
purchasing chickens, is that the expected utility of this action is negative. The actual 
utility of the act may not be negative, but because we are unaware of the probability that 
our act will be the triggering act, we should act with caution, and say that the expected 
utility is still negative.
But as Julia Nefsky points out, we have reason to push back on the idea that 
expected utility can always solve these types of problems. Nefsky argues that "there is no 
guarantee that the expected utility will come out negative in every triggering case. 
Whether it does or not depends on the probabilities and on the goodness and badness of 
the relevant consequences" (Nefsky 2011, 369). The expected utility only comes out 
negative in cases where there is a small chance of making a big (as in morally bad) 
difference. The expected utility would not be so negative if, say, the difference to be 
made was smaller, or if the chance of making such a difference was much lower. One 
way we can make the chance of making a difference smaller is to increase the size of the 
cohort. If, for example, the cohort size is 1/25, then there is a 4% chance that I will be the 
person who makes the triggering action. But in cases where the cohort exceeds 100 
people, I have a less than 1% chance of being the triggering person. At this point, despite 
the risk of making a harmful difference, I may expect the utility to be positive, given the 
small chance that I will do any harm, and the near certainty that I will derive some 
pleasure or satisfy some interest by purchasing a chicken.
Second, we have reason to push back on the conclusion that everything is some sort 
of triggering case at all. As an example, let us return to the initial worry I had about how 
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smog is created in a city. There is no single triggering point at which the amount of smog 
in the air becomes especially dangerous or bad. It seems that every car's contribution to 
air pollution makes the air slightly worse, and every act of refraining from driving makes 
it slightly less bad. Nefsky relates this problem to 'other familiar sorites problems,' like 
baldness. The triggering point at which someone is 'bald' is nuanced and unspecific. 
"Presumably, if you have enough hairs to count as not bald, then you have more than 
enough hairs: taking one away won't make you bald (nor will it make you partially bald 
or 'balding')" (Nefsky 2011, 378). From his arguments in other section of the paper, we 
can infer that Kagan would argue that the fact still remains that there must be some 
triggering point at which we say someone is 'bald,' regardless of whether or not we can 
reliably figure out where this point is. But if there is a difficulty in figuring out where the 
triggering point is, we are also going to have problems figuring out the general size of our 
cohort of other agents, and so on- leading to a very vague range of potential expected 
utility values. It seems that Kagan's appeal to negative expected utility in triggering type 
cases cannot provide a plausible reason why contributing to a collective harm is wrong.
Johnathan Glover's reasoning is very similar to Kagan's, but he takes more 
seriously the distinction between triggering and incremental difference cases. He does not 
think that incremental difference cases, or, in his words, discrimination threshold cases, 
are merely triggering cases in disguise. He is particularly more worried about 
discrimination cases where the outcome fails to come about, and the 'harm' is never 
noticed. To illustrate this point, he creates a scenario involving 100 bandits and 100 
villagers:
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"Suppose a village contains 100 unarmed tribesmen eating 
their lunch. 100 hungry armed bandits descend on the 
village and each bandit at gunpoint takes one tribesman's 
lunch and eats it. The bandits then go off, each one having 
done a discriminable amount of harm to a single tribesman. 
Next week, the bandits are tempted to do the same thing 
again, but are troubled by new-found doubts about the 
morality of such a raid. Their doubts are put to rest by one 
of their number who does not believe in the principle of 
divisibility. They then raid the village, tie up the tribesman, 
and look at their lunch. As expected, each bowl of food 
contains 100 baked beans. The pleasure derived from one 
baked bean is below the discrimination threshold. Instead 
of each bandit eating a single plateful as last week, each 
takes one bean from each plate. They leave after eating all 
the beans, pleased to have done no harm, as each has done 
no more than a sub-threshold harm to each person. Those 
who reject the principle of divisibility have to agree." 
(Glover, 174-175).
This case is an interesting collective action puzzle because it is true for each 
villager that if only one bean was stolen from their lunch (perhaps in secret), they would 
not have noticed any difference. We can say that one bean is below the 'discriminability 
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threshold' for each villager. This is why each of the bandit's actions is, individually, sub-
threshold. This case is particularly puzzling because each bandit can say for each act of 
lunch-stealing 'I did no harm, because no villager would have noticed if one bean was 
missing.' But of course, the bandits together do a discriminable amount of harm, and the 
villagers do notice when their whole lunch is missing. The puzzle that Glover has 
exposed is that of how hundreds of acts, each of them too insignificant to notice, can add 
up to such a very large difference. In fact, since the theft of one bean would not be 
noticed at all, we could even say that the harm done by the theft of one bean is zero. But 
if this is the case, how can one hundred acts that cause zero harm add up to a large 
amount of total harm?
In order to resolve this gap, Glover proposes that we should accept the principle of 
divisibility. What the principle of divisibility says is that, "in cases where harm is a matter 
of degree, sub-threshold actions are wrong to the extent that they cause harm, and where 
a hundred acts like mine are necessary to cause a detectable difference I have caused 
1/100 of that detectable harm" (Glover, 173). This means that each bandit is doing to each 
villager 1/100th of a harm. Because they do this to 100 people, each bandit is as morally 
culpable on the second day as they were on the first day. The principle of divisibility 
assigns an amount of harm to the bandits based on the harm that is actually felt, not on 
the amount of harm the bandits think they are causing. So, the bandits are responsible for 
causing a small but non-zero amount of harm. The idea that we ought to take 1/100th of a 
harm seriously is related to the fourth and fifth mistakes in moral mathematics. What the 
principle of divisibility tells us to do is take seriously the small harms done by each of the 
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bandits, and then aggregate those small harms over a set of actions.
The other kind of case Glover turns his attention to is the original distinction 
between "stronger" and "weaker" 'make no difference' cases. Remember that in stronger 
'make no difference' cases, an action makes literally zero difference to an outcome. For 
example, imagine that votes were made public in real-time. Not only was the percent of 
votes for each candidate publicly displayed, but also the percent of people who had yet to 
vote. Imagine that in some scenario, candidate A will win the election, even if all the 
people left to vote voted for candidate B. Because these votes are public, all the 
townspeople who have voted or are left to vote are aware of this fact. This is a stronger 
'make no difference' case, because no voter nor group of voters can make a difference to 
the final outcome: candidate A will win no matter what happens. In these cases, Glover 
bites a sort of bullet. In these cases, we cannot appeal directly to the difference our act 
makes to the final outcome, because it can not make a difference to the final outcome. In 
these cases, we are best to appeal to what Glover calls "side effects" and "spirals." For 
example, we could appeal to the side effect that "my vote will help keep up the morale of 
my party, or else it will help to support the system of democratic elections" (Glover, 180). 
Or, we could appeal to the fact that people would notice the margin by which one 
candidate won, and perhaps the voters should vote in order to reduce this margin and 
make a sort of political point. Glover thinks that in many cases where we make zero 
difference to an outcome, spirals and side effects such as these can almost always still 
provide reason for action (Glover, 190). So even if our action makes no difference to an 
outcome, we might still have auxiliary reasons that tell us to do that action anyway.
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We have to admit that Glover's principle of divisibility helps to get a more 
acceptable answer in the bandits case than what we get without it. But I am not convinced 
that the principle of divisibility provides a strong reason against participating in collective 
harms. First, it is not clear what justification Glover has for the principle of divisibility 
itself, other than that it gets the right answer; that is, it makes the Bandit's acts seem 
wrong. But secondly, we can achieve the same result by appealing to Parfit's second 
mistake in moral mathematics. Parfit writes that it is wrong to think "if some act is right 
or wrong because of its effects, the only relevant effects are the effects of this particular 
act" (Parfit, 70). Glover makes the second mistake in moral mathematics because he does 
not see the bandits as a cohort, nor does he see their actions as a 'set of actions' (Parfit, 
70). From the perspective of an individual bandit, the first and second methods of lunch 
stealing are different- on one day, the individual bandit steals one lunch from one person, 
and on the second, 1/100th of a lunch from 100 people. But if we consider the bandits as 
a cohort, whose acts are counted as a set of acts, there is no difference in the amount of 
harm done between the first and second type of theft: on day one, (a cohort of) 100 
bandits stole (as a 'set' of individual acts of stealing) 100 lunches, from 100 villagers. The 
exact same is true on the second day. By avoiding the second mistake, we see that there is 
no difference in moral wrongness between the first and second days. If the result that the 
principle of divisibility gets could be obtained through different means, it is not clear why 
we should prefer the principle of divisibility over some other moral mathematical 
methodology.
I argue that Parfit, Kagan, and Glover all fail to explain why it is wrong to 
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participate in collective harms. The attempts to explain this so far can all be labeled 
'accounting' solutions4. What Parfit, Kagan, and Glover are arguing is that if we avoid 
making certain procedural mistakes in moral mathematical calculations, we can get to the 
result that it is wrong to participate in collective harms. However, in Parfit's case, the 
solutions he proposes raise more questions than they solve, requiring a large amount of 
additional work before we have a theory that can really be applied to cases. Against 
Kagan, we should push back on the idea that every collective action problem is some sort 
of triggering case. We should also push back on his assertion that the expected utility in 
collective harm cases will be negative. It is unclear what work Glover's principle of 
divisibility is supposed to do, and how it fits in to a larger scheme of moral mathematics.
J. J. C. Smart provides a novel approach to solving this puzzle. Smart's solution is 
based on a straightforward act utilitarianism calculation that involves elements of game 
theory. I think this solution differs enough from the ones presented above to warrant a 
separate section. Smart provides a different way of explaining why we have reason not to 
contribute to collectively-caused harms that is more in line with the type of rational-
egoist thinking we often see in the language of economics. The primary puzzle that Smart 
is concerned about is a collective action problem that R.B. Brandt uses to argue against 
utilitarianism. Smart, however, thinks he can resolve this problem. The case in question 
can be called the “heater case:” 
4 This terminology is owed to David. T. Schwartz from his book “Consuming Choices: Ethics in a 
Global Consumer Age,” 2010, p54: but I believe I am using this terminology in a slightly different way 
than he originally intended. He means that 'accounting solutions' are those which “assert[s] that 
individual responsibility for collective wrongdoing is straightforwardly determinable” through division, 
such as in Parfit's “share of the total” view. I am using it to describe solutions which suggest that 
individual responsibility is determinable, through whatever mathematical mechanism these 
philosophers might propose.
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"[Consider] the case of a utilitarian in wartime England, 
and it is supposed that there is a governmental request that 
a maximum temperature of 50 degrees F should be 
maintained in homes, so as to conserve gas and electricity. 
A utilitarian Frenchman who is resident in England might 
conceivably reason as follows: 'It is very unlikely that the 
vast majority of Englishmen will not comply with the 
request. But it will do no harm at all if a few people, such 
as myself, live in a temperature of 70 degrees F. And it will 
do these few people a lot of good for their comfort. 
Therefore the general happiness will be increased by my 
using enough electricity and gas to make myself 
comfortable.' The Frenchman thus decides to use the 
electricity and gas" (Smart, 42). 
If we accept Kagan and Glover's reasoning, we know that the Frenchman does do 
some incremental amount of harm, but because this harm is dispersed among all the 
citizens of Britain, we know that it does not do any one person a discriminable amount of 
harm, and will likely go unnoticed by others. Where Smart's reasoning diverges from 
Kagan and Glover's is that he bites the bullet, and is willing to say that the private good to 
the Frenchman, if it outweighs the harms done to the public, makes using the extra fuel 
what the Frenchman ought to do. This is a stronger claim than that the Frenchman's 
actions are merely permissible: Smart argues that if we are committed act utilitarians, we 
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must admit that using the fuel is what the Frenchman ought to do. But, of course, this is 
just one reason for action, and Smart thinks there are other potentially overriding reasons 
that the Frenchman ought not to use the heat. The first is the probability of getting caught, 
and the punishment that would result from this. "The act utilitarian will have to agree that 
if his behavior could be kept secret then he ought in this case to use the electricity and 
gas. But he should also agree that he should be condemned and punished if he should be 
found out" (Smart, 42). This is because, Smart argues, we must keep the utility of an 
action separate from the utility of praise or blame of an action (Smart, 42).
Imagine that we change the example, so that everyone involved is a convinced and 
dedicated act utilitarian. Now, presumably, every citizen knows that every other citizen 
reasoned in the same way that the Frenchman did, and also saw this loophole by which 
evading the government decree could increase personal benefit. Of course, if everyone 
were to reason in this way and everyone used the heat, the results would be "disastrous" 
(Smart, 42). But, we are holding constant in this situation that the nobody has access to 
"premisses about what other people will do, and each of them will not know how to plan 
his actions unless they know what the rest of the people (including the Frenchman) will 
do" (Smart, 43). Because of these constraints, Smart thinks our best bet will be in 
applying game theory. The utilitarian, always concerned about maximizing good and 
minimizing harm, will see that at some point N, where N is the number of people using 
the fuel, that the aggregate harm to the community will outweigh the benefit to the N 
individuals who are using the fuel. Smart concludes (rightly, I think) that this number 
would have to be very small. Using game theory, the Frenchman sees three options: 
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comply with the government request, use the heat, or "decide to give himself a certain 
probability of disobeying the government's request." The number of heat-users should be 
small, and this, combined with the probability of each person being one of the lucky few 
heat-users will lead to a probability that "will be so near zero that the act utilitarian would 
not bother to calculate it, but would just obey the government's request" (Smart, 44). 
Smart's solution is similar to Kagan's, in that the motivation not to undertake the action is 
the risk of being a person whose act lowers total utility. However, Smart's theory has the 
benefit of not being dependent on Kagan's distinction between triggering cases and 
incremental difference cases.
I think the strongest objection to Smart is that we ought to take the original 
intention of the heater case seriously. R.B. Brandt believed that the conclusion that the 
Frenchman had a moral duty to use the heat was an objectionable conclusion. I think this 
case helps shed light on an important underlying structure of many collective action 
problems. The only reason that the Frenchman seems to have a moral duty to use the heat 
is because of the scale on which we are evaluating the actions and its effects. The 
underlying structure is this. There is an individual who would derive a private benefit 
from using some resource: this is an individual perspective. The harms that result from 
using the resource are spread among the community at large: a community perspective. 
Then we continue to take a community perspective when we say that the private benefit 
to the Frenchman gets counted as a community benefit, because he is a member of the 
community. The shifting of evaluative perspectives creates this problem. If we take a 
community perspective from the beginning, we see that there is no reason for the 
Stolt, 26
Frenchman to use the heat. If the benefit is proportional to the harms (and in this case, it 
seems to be) then the net balance to utility is zero.
There is another related worry that applies to Glover and Smart's appeal to auxiliary 
concerns, such as being caught by the authorities. If we once again assume that the 
private benefit to the Frenchman is worth the cost to the public, then he ought to use the 
heat. Then, we might factor in the negative utility of getting caught. This could motivate 
the Frenchman not to use the heat. But it could also motivate the Frenchman to find ways 
of not getting caught. If the Frenchman is, indeed, a committed act utilitarian, then in 
order for him to choose to devise a way to not get caught, the opportunity cost of doing 
so must be lower than the pleasure he gets from using the heat. This could easily be the 
case. What I am arguing is that an appeal to side effects such as 'getting caught' or 'being 
publicly exposed as someone who does not support the war effort' cannot always override 
reasons for acting, and in fact, could motivate the Frenchman to find ways of disguising 
his behavior. Smart's approach also fails to provide strong reasons not to participate in 
collective harms. In fact, Smart admits that depending on the features of the situation, 
participating in a collective harm might be what the committed act-utilitarian ought to do; 
in which case we must rely on an appeal to side effects or the expected utility of an action 
in order to make it seem wrong again.
Of course, one way of resolving the heater case would be to appeal to the fact that 
if everyone used extra heat, the result would be disastrous. But in act utilitarianism, 
where the moral scale of evaluation typically focuses on individual agents, we cannot 
appeal to these kinds of concerns. Rule utilitarianism, however, can appeal to 
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universalizability tests. Rule utilitarianism (generally speaking) is an approach in which 
utilitarian calculations are used to create a set of rules, and if everyone followed these 
rules, utility would be maximized. I will be focusing on rule utilitarianism as it is 
explained by R.M. Hare in "Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism” (1982). One of the 
reasons that Hare, as a supporter of the principle of utility in general, develops a system 
of rule utilitarianism is that he notices the difficulty in making act-utilitarian calculations. 
For example, how are we to weigh the present versus future interests of people? What are 
their true interests in a deeper sense? How do alternative courses of action weigh in, 
when we consider that the agent in question may not be aware that these alternate courses 
of action exist? (Hare, 27). This would also resolve many of the difficulties I have 
brought up so far, including difficulties about the scales on which we evaluate actions, 
and what constitutes a relevant set of acts. 
Hare sets forth a few ideals about how the utilitarian calculus should be carried out. 
First, he argues that the principle of utility is necessarily just. "If we ask how we are to be 
just between given the competing interests of different people, it seems hard to give any 
other answer than that it is by giving equal weight, impartially, to the equal interests of 
everybody" (Hare, 26). This should solve some difficulty in cases where the benefit is 
private and the harm is public. We must take a third-person view and assess the interests 
of all involved equally. Second, when making moral judgments, we must universalize 
prudence; so that the judging we do is done as rationally as possible (Hare, 25). Lastly, 
when we consider moral decisions, we must think of the "desires and likings of those 
whom I take in to account of affected parties" of any course of action (Hare, 29). This 
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turns our attention to anyone who would be affected in any way by our actions, including 
ourselves, but only insofar as we are one of the affected party. Hare calls this kind of 
thinking "level-2" moral thinking. This kind of thinking is 'leisurely,' and done with 
complete knowledge of relevant facts.
One reason hare turns to rule utilitarianism is because, in everyday situations, we do 
not have the time nor information to employ level-2 moral thought. On a day-to-day 
basis, we need level-1 moral thought, which consists of weighing an action against 
consistent and clear rules and principles. These rules and principles are arrived at after 
careful deliberation in level-2 thought. Because we make decisions as they accord with 
moral rules, Hare thinks problems like the heater case and issues about voting are simply 
not problematic for rule utilitarians (Hare, 36). This is for two main reasons. First, if we 
take a level-2 viewpoint, when the Frenchman uses the heat, his action fails the universal 
test and the prescriptivity test- he could not prescribe that everyone universally act as he 
does. Second, his act fails on utilitarian grounds, because he is considering his own 
interests as more worthy than the interests of the people he is stealing from, were they 
perfectly prudent and thus aware of the theft. Lastly, if we resume level-1 thinking, it 
would have disastrous consequences if society adopted a general rule that said that 
actions like the Frenchman's were permissible.
But how exactly is Hare able to completely evade worries about collective action 
problems? I suggest that it is because he is unafraid to abandon act-utilitarianism and 
moral mathematics in general. The only moral mathematics that we do are in level-2 
thought, but in those cases, we are completely aware of all the relevant facts and interests 
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at hand. In level-1 thought, we have no reason to employ moral mathematics. This 
abandonment of act-utilitarian calculation of course upsets act utilitarians, but I do not 
object to the abandonment of act utilitarianism in this way. There are other more serious 
objections to rule utilitarianism; within the philosophical community it seems to be a 
notoriously indefensible position. I do not have the space to list these objections to rule 
utilitarianism, but we can at least recognize that it stands on shaky ground. However, 
despite all this, we should interpret the ideas presented in rule utilitarianism as signposts 
pointing us in the right direction. If Hare is successful because he avoids act 
utilitarianism, creates a system of ethics based on rules and principles, and has a system 
of ethics that is universalizable; we should look for other ethical systems that also have 
these features.
I argue that consequentialist and utilitarian frameworks fail to adequately explain 
reasons why agents ought not to participate in collectively-caused harms, let alone why 
they ought not refrain from participating in collectively-caused benefits. The accounting-
type solutions of Parfit, Glover, and Kagan fail to explain how, using moral mathematics, 
we can consistently explain why individuals ought not participate in the causation of 
collective harms. Like Kagan, Smart suggests that using game theory, the expected utility 
of an action can be shown to be negative. And like Glover, he suggests that often, the side 
effects of actions can make them praiseworthy or condemnable for reasons not directly 
related to the collective action problem at hand. But what I hope to have shown is that 
these solutions are ultimately not plausible. Hare's response is to abandon moral 
mathematics almost entirely, and he successfully avoids the puzzle posed by collective 
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action problems. I suggest that we should interpret Hare's success here as a signifier that 
perhaps all moral mathematical solutions are problematic. If the problem at hand is a 
moral mathematical puzzle, perhaps instead of approaching it with different mathematical 
solutions, we should approach it from non-mathematical ethical frameworks.
Section 3: Deontology and the Group Agency solution
Deontology is an ethical system based on ideas about underlying principles and 
universalizability tests; and as such, is typically far less mathematical than 
consequentialist frameworks. More specifically, deontology focuses on how the rightness 
or wrongness of an action is based on how it discharges or fails to discharge rights, 
duties, and obligations. Where consequentialists look at the effects of an action, 
deontologists are generally more concerned with an act's intentions. Initially, deontology 
looks like it will have no problem handling the kind of problems I have been discussing. 
First, deontology offers a number of ready-at-hand explanations as to why some of the 
acts we have been discussing might be wrong. For example, it might be wrong to pollute 
because doing so violates some right, like the right of people downstream not to be made 
sick. Or, in the beans and bandits case, we could say that the bandits wronged the 
villagers by the mere fact of stealing the beans, because stealing violates a moral duty 
against theft.
But deontology faces its own type of problems in handling collective action cases.  
One of the central ideas in deontological thought is the idea that ‘ought implies can.’ 
‘Ought implies can’ is the premise that in order for an agent to be obligated to do 
something, the obligation must be something they could actually do. This is relevant both 
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to collectively caused harms and benefits. Imagine some potential collective benefit, like 
famine relief, that could be achieved if enough people donated to Oxfam. Suppose also 
that there is some sort of prima facie obligation to end great moral wrongs such as 
famines. However, the end of famine relief is not a possible action that any individual 
alone could achieve: achieving this end would require a group of agents. Because ought 
implies can, individuals cannot be obligated to do what only a group of people could 
possibly do. This puts us in a peculiar place- our participation in the production of a 
collective benefit is contingent on the fact that enough others are also participating in this 
scheme. If others are not participating, we can have no obligations concerning that end. 
The deontologist has at least some grounds for concluding that “if nobody else is doing 
X, why should I?”
This, of course, is a straw man portrayal of deontology, and no sophisticated 
deontological theory of ethics agrees with this conclusion in this way. In the following 
section, I will explore two common methods for resolving these issues. The first method 
we could use is to take a Kantian approach. Immanuel Kant was an 18th-century German 
philosopher whose work is considered a foundation of deontology. But in many ways, 
Kant’s philosophy is not particularly well-built to handle the kinds of problems we have 
been discussing. For example, take Kagan’s pollution example. I have the intuition that 
what the factory owner does wrong in this case is that he causes many people to get sick. 
If we apply familiar Kantian tests to these kinds of problems, we don’t get intuitive 
results. For example, Kant’s second formulation of the categorical imperative tells us to 
always treat humanity as ends in themselves, never merely as a means (Kant, 29). We 
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could say that the factory owner does wrong because he treats the sick people as mere 
means to the end of production in his factory. But this account of wrongness seems 
misguided. The factory owner does not intend for people to get sick, and it is not the case 
that people must get sick if the work at the factory is to continue. Getting people sick is a 
side effect of the factory owner’s intended actions, and the factory owner may not even 
be aware of this side effect. It does not seem like an appeal to treating people as ends is 
going to process this situation properly.
We get similar results if we apply Kant’s first formulation of the categorical 
imperative, in which he says 'act only in accordance with that maxim through which you 
can at the same time will that it become a universal law' (Kant, 10). Under this formula, 
the factory owner should ask himself, what if everyone acted in accordance with a maxim 
such as 'pollution is permissible.' In a world that operated on this maxim, there would be 
no contradiction in will- that is, the factory owner's attempts to pollute would not be 
defeated. Second, there is no contradiction in conception- that is, there is no reason we 
cannot imagine a world in which everybody pollutes: this world would be an unfortunate 
one, but it is a conceptual possibility. My argument here is not that Kant cannot somehow 
derive reasons not to participate in collective harms. What I am arguing is that familiar 
Kantian tools are not easily nor straightforwardly applied to collective action cases. 
A more promising account comes from a recent development in deontological 
theory that argues that groups can be moral agents. If groups can be agents, then they can 
bear obligations and act in accordance with maxims. The idea is that if groups can be 
agents, they can be obligated to do things that groups could do, like enter into projects 
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like producing collective benefits. Also, group agency could work in a negative way, by 
saying that groups are responsible for collective harms, or for failing to discharge 
important obligations. In order to do this, deontologists will have to explain a number of 
things. First, they will have to explain what criteria a group must meet in order to be 
considered an agent. Next, they will have to explain how group obligations translate to 
individual obligations. If this can be done, it could yield the result that individuals have 
strong reasons to participate in groups that can produce collective benefits or avoid 
collective harms.
 Stephanie Collins makes one such attempt at fleshing out an argument for moral 
groups and group agency. Collins wants her theory to be rooted in standard deontological 
concepts. For example, it is a common assumption that only agents can bear duties 
(Collins, 2). So, in order for a group to bear a moral duty, it will have to be an agent. 
Collin's method of arguing for this conclusion is to show how groups meet basic criteria 
for moral agency. But Collins wants to resist "relaxing our concept of agency so much 
that it loses its distinctiveness" (Collins, 3). In order to avoid this, Collins creates two 
criteria for group agency. First, the group of people must have a decision-making 
procedure that processes reasons. Second, the decision-making process must output roles. 
If a group meets these two criteria, it meets what Collins calls the agency condition. 
These group agents are more accurately called 'collectives' (Collins, 2). In order for an 
obligation to hold for a collective, it must also meet the 'can condition,' that is, it must be 
able to bring about the outcome required by the duty.
The agency condition is most important to Collins. The presence of a decision 
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making procedure seems to do the majority of the work in securing a group's status as an 
agent. The decision-making procedure is important because it takes in reasons, such as 
action-demanding duties (Collins, 2). Once these reasons are internalized, the group 
decision-making process generates three outputs. The first is a set of group aims. The 
second is a set of individual roles which are "each necessary and jointly sufficient to 
achieve those aims/s," and third is a distribution of these roles to the members of the 
group (Collins, 8). These roles are Collins' second criteria for agency. These roles are 
how group agents act as collectives. It is not enough that the group take in and process 
reasons; they must try to achieve their ends. The only way that a group can act in a 
coordinated way is by the assignment of roles. By making this move, Collins is 
supporting a strict idea about collective action. For Collins, it is not enough that a group 
merely share an aim or intention. It is also not sufficient if all of the group members do 
the same action. For Collins, an act is not a collective action unless it is a highly 
coordinated, role-based effort to fulfill an obligation through the fulfillment of individual 
roles.
Once a group meets these conditions for collective agency, we must also assess 
whether or not they meet the 'can condition.' This is an important solution to the problem 
posed by the 'ought implies can' problem. A collective meets this condition if it 'is 
sufficiently likely to φ, given that it tries" (Collins, 12). Some collectives will fail this 
condition. Imagine that there are three people present at the scene of a house fire5. Let's 
also suppose that these three people each recognize that there is a prima facie moral 
obligation to put out this house fire. The group processes this reason using a decision-
5 Credit is owed to Dr. Richard Lee for this thought experiment.
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making procedure which distributes roles to these agents. If the group does this, they 
meet the agency condition. But, the group members might soon see that they fail the can 
condition: that is, no distribution of roles can change the fact that they lack sufficient 
numbers to form a bucket brigade that reaches the nearby pond. They cannot put out the 
fire. We can imagine that if the size of the group was twenty people as opposed to three, 
they might meet the 'can condition,' because they would have enough people to form an 
efficient bucket brigade capable of putting out the fire. But, as it stands, the group is not 
able to put out the fire, and so their obligation to do so dissolves.
Collins gives a sophisticated account of how groups of people can be considered 
agents and under what conditions, and how obligations relate to collectives. But there is 
still a piece missing in that Collins has not yet explained how the obligations recognized 
by collectives translate to individual obligations. This is an important problem. Collins 
gives an example featuring six beachgoers. Five are on the beach sunbathing, and one is 
drowning. The five could coordinate their efforts and save the drowning person (Collins, 
4). However, it is true that each beachgoer cannot, as an individual, save the drowning 
person. Because ought implies can, each individual cannot be obligated to save the 
drowning person. "To avoid this result, we need collectivisation duties. These are 
individual duties to be responsive to others with a view to there being a group that meets 
Agency and Can conditions" (Collins, 14). Collin's argument for this is detailed, but in its 
simplest form, it runs like this: "A (the individual agent) has a duty to secure the means to 
discharging his duties. If A has a duty to φ (where φ requires a collective), and ψ is the 
best means to φ (where ψ is A's individual responsive collectivising action), then A has a 
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duty to ψ" (Collins, 14). This argument helps explain some common intuitions about 
collectivisation. For example, if you witness a house on fire, you might rightly conclude 
that there is nothing you could individually do to put it out. However, since you recognize 
a collectivisation duty, you might attempt to form a collective with the bystanders around 
you in order to discharge the obligation to put out the fire. The obligation to collectivise 
only dissolves once the agent has thoroughly tried to form a collective.
However, justifying such a duty is a difficult task. Some people argue that group 
duties are not translatable to individual duties in any way. Torböjrn Tännsjö makes this 
argument. He thinks that "no sound moral principle can take us automatically from our 
collective duty to our individual duty" (Tännsjö, 223). First, he points out that there is no 
reason to assume that in all cases of this type that the collective obligation can be equally 
divided into shares and parts. Second, in almost all collective agency cases, in order to 
meet the 'can condition,' the other members of the group must also participate. Given 
these premises, we conclude that "if the other one is not doing his share, I am under no 
obligation to do mine" (Tännsjö, 223). This can be further illustrated by appealing to an 
example. Tännsjö supposes that two people undertake the collective action of pouring 
water into the pool and jumping in to it. In this case, the 'jumping in' action is conditional 
on the pool being filled. If there is no water in the pool, the obligation to jump in 
dissolves. 
While I think that Tännsjö's objection is ultimately mistaken, it does raise an 
interesting worry for Collin's account. I argued that in order for a deontologist to 
conclude that individuals have duties not to participate in collectively-caused harms, they 
Stolt, 37
will need to explain away the excuse that “if everyone else is not participating, why 
should I?” I do not think Collins can successfully avoid this worry. For Collins, a 
collectivisation duty is only fully discharged once all attempts have been made to 
convince others to joint the collective project. She also argues that the importance of the 
duty to collectivise provides incentive to “affect the phenomena [of the situation] so as to 
make the collective’s existence more likely.” But the fact remains that if others refuse to 
collectivise, the obligation to collectivise dissolves.
An other attempt to explain the source of duties to collectivise comes from Holly 
Lawford-Smith. Lawford-Smith disagrees with Collins about how the collective 
obligations translate to individual obligations. She divides collective action cases into 
four distinct types, and argues that the collective to individual distribution of obligations 
is different in each type. The first kind of case is an 'incremental good' case, where the 
action of each member 'makes things a little better' (Lawford-Smith, 9). In these cases, 
each member has an obligation to take a "capacity-relative share" in fulfilling the 
obligation. The second type of case is 'joint necessity,' where all the collective members 
must act to bring about an end. In these cases, individuals also have an obligation to take 
a capacity-relative share, "unless she has the reasonable belief that at least one other 
member of the collective will not take a capacity-relative share in fulfilling the 
obligation" (Lawford-Smith, 10). 
The last two types of cases are similar. In 'threshold good' cases, a number of people 
are required to bring about an outcome; say, four people lifting a couch in order to move 
it. In these cases, the individual has an obligation to take a capacity-relative share unless 
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she has the reasonable belief that enough others will take a share and the obligation will 
be fulfilled without her assistance. In the last type of case, 'threshold good with harm,' a 
number of people are required to produce an outcome, but if too many people assist, "that 
would be a hindrance" (Lawford-Smith, 10). In these cases, individuals have the 
obligation to do their share, unless enough others are already participating, in which case 
the individual should refrain, so as not to cause unnecessary harm (Lawford-Smith, 10). 
Lawford-Smith's argument is unique, because she explains that context can effect how 
collective obligations translate to individual obligations. It also makes potentially useful 
distinctions between types of cases.
Most importantly, Lawford-Smith's argument shows that in some cases, it can be 
important to undertake an action even if others refuse to collectivise. In 'incremental 
good' cases, every action towards some end helps. This seems to be the case for donations 
made to organizations like Oxfam. Although individual donations will not be sufficient to 
end world hunger, individual donations do alleviate the suffering of individuals in the 
world, regardless of whether or not others collectivise and also donate. In other cases, 
where an action is impossible unless enough others collectivise, it does make sense to 
admit that individual obligations to collectivise dissolve if others refuse to collectivise. 
This seems to be the case in the bucket brigade case. If others refuse to help put out the 
fire, there is no point in one individual attempting to put out the fire. This would be a 
waste of time, because one individual cannot make the fire any incrementally less worse.
Lawford-Smith's distinctions suggest that there may be important differences 
between different structures of cases, and that the obligation to collectivise may take 
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different forms in these different types of cases. But it is not clear why we should suppose 
that all cases of these sorts really do divide so nicely into these four general structures. 
Second, it is not clear if there is any justification for the different distributions of 
collectivisation duties in these cases, other than that it explains common intuitions.
The last account of group-agency we will look at is Terry Isaacs'. Isaacs works to 
distinguish between relevant types of groups. According to Isaacs, there are two types of 
collectives: Organizations, and Goal-Oriented collectives. Organizations are highly-
structured groups with clear roles, decision-making procedures, and consistent aims, 
principles, and interests (Isaacs, 42). Examples of organizations are corporations and 
universities. Goal-Oriented collectives are more loosely structured, and arise out of 
"shared understandings and a sense of purpose" (Isaacs, 42). Goal-oriented collectives 
achieve their ends because the intentions of individual agents 'propel' the collective 
intentions further. Goal-oriented collectives may be more or less cohesive than 
Organizations. One other important category is social groups. Social groups are not 
collectives. In social groups, agents are categorized because of some feature they share in 
common; such as "women," or "cashiers" (Isaacs, 42). The social group of "cashiers" 
does not meet even minimal criteria for agency, so they are not a collective agent. But it 
is important to keep social groups in mind with "respect to the more forward-looking 
collective obligation," meaning "groups that may have the potential to become effective 
collective agents" should the scenario arise (Isaacs, 42). So even though "cashiers" are 
not a group agent, it could be that in some case, the social group of “cashiers” could 
recognize a collectivization duty in order to solve some problem that the group of 
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cashiers would be best at addressing.
Isaacs' account also provides an alternate form of explaining negative collective 
obligation, or obligations to avoid participating in collective harms. Isaacs distinguishes 
between collective responsibility and collective obligation. Collective obligation is 
forward-looking, and prescriptive in nature (Isaacs, 44). It describes what a collective 
ought to do. Collective responsibility, on the other hand, is retrospective and evaluative. 
Responsibility in this sense concerns the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of actions 
(Isaacs, 43). For example, we could say that a collective was responsible for the creation 
of some harm, and blame that collective for this action. Because collective obligation is 
future-oriented, it "can play a key role in mobilizing groups of people" to solve problems 
that require collectives (Isaacs, 44). For example, Isaacs argues that the social group of 
'men' are causally important in creating a culture of violence against women. Because 
'men' are a social group, they are not a collective, so are not a collective agent. Because 
of this, we cannot hold the social group of 'men' responsible for this problem. But, we can 
say that the social group of 'men' is a putative agent, that is, capable of collectivising and 
forming a collective agent, which could then fulfill an obligation. This putative collective 
agent could both be held responsible in a retrospective way and obligated to solve 
problems in a prescriptive sense (Isaacs, 52).
Despite the arguments made by these philosophers, I think that deontological group 
theory fails to answer some of the major worries about why it might be wrong to 
participate in a collectively-caused harm, or fail to participate in a collectively-caused 
benefit. I do not think deontological group agency theories are able to answer the excuse I 
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presented at the beginning of this section: that is, “if nobody else is doing X, why should 
I?” or, alternately, “if everyone else is doing X, why should I refrain?” Because of 
deontology's commitment to the 'ought implies can' thesis, it will always be subject to the 
problem that if enough others defect from a collective action, agents no longer have an 
obligation to carry out their collective role. Unless we agree with Lawford-Smith, in 
which case we could argue that in 'incremental good' cases, agents have a duty to assist 
even if others defect, since every bit of assistance helps.
Second, Deontology's focus on the highly sophisticated groups with internal 
decision-making procedures and the ability to process moral duties limits the scope of 
these solutions to very few real-world cases. In the real world, collectively-caused harms 
tend to result from the collective unintended effects of many agents acting independently. 
For example, climate change is caused by many people who use or purchase things that 
emit or lead to emissions of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. Climate change is 
caused by people who drive to work, purchase many kinds of plastics, run coal-fired 
power plants, and farmers who raise beef cattle. Groups like 'greenhouse gas-emitters' are 
large, unstructured, and lacking any of the criteria for agency that Collins or others 
require. Since this is the case, it seems that collective agency theories cannot explain why 
any of these acts are wrong. Isaacs comes close to answering this puzzle by positing that 
social groups can be putative agents, or loosely-structured groups capable of 
collectivising. But in these large social groups, it is unclear where the motivation to 
collectivise would come from. In order to collectivise, all members of the group would 
have to recognize the same morally important obligation, and that this obligation could 
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only be achieved if all the group members cooperated. If deontological group theories 
cannot handle these kinds of groups, then deontological group theories would only be 
applicable in a few limited real-world cases.
One other hurdle that group agency theories must overcome is that in many ways, 
the consequentialist approach is more intuitive. What seems to matter in most collective 
action cases is the effects of the group action, or the consequences that the group brings 
about. In Kagan's chicken case, for example, the group of consumers together trigger the 
raising and killing of additional chickens in order to keep up with demand. As Nefsky 
points out, the wrongness of the action is intuitively and closely related to the fact that a 
purchase is causally linked to the raising of more chickens: that is, "it makes a difference 
to decisions to increase (or decrease) production by the factory farm" (Nefsky 2011, 370-
371). Consequentialism focuses on an intuitive part of this problem: the consequences 
produced by the group. The deontologist has a harder time explaining this intuition. The 
group of consumers is not a group agent. Perhaps we could say that they ought to 
recognize a duty to collectivise, or that they are subject to backward-looking collective 
responsibility for an obligation they failed to discharge. But this kind of thinking seems 
to abandon the idea that the wrongness of the group action is related to the negative 
effects it causes. Nefsky argues that because of this fact, we should look for the answer in 
consequentialism (Nefsky 2012, 29). I do not think that we must necessarily look for the 
answer in consequentialism, but we should look for an ethical system that maintains some 
kind of closer link between the wrongness of actions and their effects. 
In conclusion, deontological group-agency theory makes an important and useful 
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attempt to explain why it is wrong to participate in collective harms, or why we ought to 
participate in the creation of benefits that could only be produced through a collective. 
However, deontology fails to evade a number of central worries about the conclusions it 
reaches. I think that many of these worries stem from the deontological framework itself, 
especially deontology's commitment to the 'ought implies can' idea. Because of this idea, 
it seems that in almost all cases, a duty to refrain from participating in a collectively 
caused harm can be defeated by the fact that others refuse to refrain from participating. 
Second, deontological group agency theory has a difficult time handling cases involving 
the large, loosely-structured, and diverse groups that cause collective harms or do not 
create collective benefits in the real world. Last, the deontological framework maintains a 
deliberate separateness from the moral importance of the effects of actions, which does 
not line up with a central intuition in collective action problems.
Section 4: Contractarianism, Contractualism, and Social Systems of Ethics
One other ethical theory we should consider is social contract theory. Social 
contract theory is a family ethical theories which maintain that the rightness and 
wrongness of actions should be evaluated with regard to an underlying social 
understanding or agreement. One of the major branches of social contract theory is 
contractarianism, which argues that people are primarily motivated by rational egoism, 
but constrain their self-interested desires when it is beneficial to do so. Contractualism, 
on the other hand, is concerned with the rights of people, and the motivational desire to 
justify our actions to people we share social arrangements with. Compared to deontology, 
contract theories have a very different metaethical underpinning. The deontological world 
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is made up of obligations, which are taken to be weighty, objective things. The contract 
theorist understands morality in relative terms, and believes that morality is constructed 
through the interaction of people. 
How might contract theories answer the puzzle at hand? Generally, contractarians 
evaluate the rightness or wrongness of an action based on whether or not it is consistent 
with some moral agreement. If we are trying to argue that it is morally wrong to 
participate in schemes that collectively cause harms, we must show that this action is 
inconsistent with some general moral agreement. Contractualists are concerned with 
whether or not we can justify our actions to others.  For the contractualist, we must ask if 
participating in collectively-caused harms is an action that we can justify to others; 
specifically those who are harmed by the collectively-caused harm. I argue that in these 
cases, the contract theorist can make sense of the wrongness of these types of actions.
First, we will look at the contractarian branch of contract theory. Contractarianism 
traces back to Hobbes' thoughts on constrained rational egoism. The contractarian story 
begins by supposing that people are primarily motivated by rational egoism. Rational 
egoism is the idea that what it is rational for anyone to do is to maximize their own self-
interested aims. But of course, in a world with scarce resources and a society where every 
individual acts only to maximize their self-interest, our efforts to achieve these aims will 
lead to chaos. The most common example of this is a collective action problem called the 
tragedy of the commons, first described by Garret Hardin in 1968. The commons is a 
public grazing area. Each shepherd, hoping to maximize his personal economic return, 
will turn as many sheep out to graze as possible. If every shepherd who uses this public 
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grazing area did this, the resource would collapse, and all the shepherds would make no 
money. If each acts in a purely self-interested way, they will obtain suboptimal results. In 
this case, individual rational egoists produce a collective harm.
Contractarianism suggests that the foundation of ethics is in agreements between 
agents to constrain their rational egoist behavior in order to achieve the best possible ends 
for everyone. An example of this would be if the shepherds set grazing limits. This would 
constrain their behavior, but in a way that ensures the maximum sustainable profit for 
each person involved. For example, each shepherd could agree to set out five sheep each. 
Doing so would provide modest profits for the shepherd, but would also guarantee that no 
collective harm is created. In fact, contractarian ethics seems to have been what was on 
Hardin's mind when he concluded that the only solution to the tragedy of the commons 
was "mutual coercion mutually agreed upon" (Hardin, 1247). But Hardin was not a 
philosopher, and was not intending to write a philosophically tight argument. In the 
following section, we will look at philosophical approaches to puzzles of this sort, and 
assess their plausibility in explaining the wrongness of contributing to collective harms.
Gilbert Harman is one philosopher who has developed an advanced concept of 
contractarian ethics. Harman argues that "morality arises when a group of people reach an 
implicit agreement or come to a tacit understanding about their relations with one 
another" (Harman, 3). One of the building blocks of Harman's theory is the idea that inner 
moral judgments only make sense when weighed against "motivational attitudes" like 
"goals, desires [and] intentions" (Harman, 9). Inner moral judgments are inner judgments 
about how someone ought or ought not to have acted, or whether it was right or wrong of 
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someone to act in a certain way (Harman, 4). Harman argues that it is not enough for 
these kinds of judgments to be made based on an agent A, considerations C, and a type of 
act D; but that we must also include the motivating attitudes that the agent has. 
These motivating attitudes take a specific form in that 'they derive from an 
agreement.' Harman argues that motivating attitudes are “intentions to adhere to a 
particular agreement on the understanding that others also intend to do so" (Harman, 11-
12). These agreements are reached through a bargaining process. "In order to further our 
interests, we form certain conditional intentions, hoping that others will do the same" 
(Harman, 13). But of course, not everyone will have the same conditional intentions. 
Through implicit bargaining, we discover what intentions we can compromise on, and 
share as a group. When we say that someone ought to do something, say, recycle, what 
we are saying is that given the act of recycling in a certain circumstance, and the shared 
moral intention to 'live in a cleaner city,' they ought to do so.
But Harman bites the bullet in a case where the agent in question does not share this 
moral intention. Imagine an agent who does not have the moral intention to live in a 
cleaner city, although the vast majority of other citizens do share this intention. Because 
this person does not share a morally relevant attitude, we cannot make full-fledged inner 
judgments about what such an agent ought or ought not to do. Since the cleanliness of a 
city does not motivate this person, we cannot say their act was inconsistent with this 
agreement. But Harman also admits that in cases like these, we are not without ways of 
convincing such agents that these intentions are ones that they ought to share. For 
example, "we can argue by appealing to inconsistencies, incoherencies, and whether or 
Stolt, 47
not an agreement is self-defeating" in order to show someone that their moral intentions 
are in some sense, bad or wrong (Harman, 16). Also, we can appeal to the 'ought of 
rationality,' the 'normative ought to be' and the 'moral ought to do' in order to convince 
someone that they ought to share in our widely-held moral intentions (Harman, 6). So 
even if we cannot say that the non-recycler does something wrong, we can say that they 
ought to share the moral intention to keep a city clean, and that if they shared this moral 
intention, they would see that not-recycling was wrong.
David Gauthier's approach to contractarian ethics is not based on inner moral 
judgments, but instead on a fuller account of rational egoism. In his article "Why 
Contractarianism?", he sets out to prove that agreements about the pursuit of rational 
interests form the basis of morality. Gauthier wants to ground his moral reason in a way 
that coheres with "psychological states” like “desires and beliefs" (Gauthier, 16). Through 
a process Gauthier calls deliberative justification, we make choices and commit to actions 
which "maximize the agent's expected utility, where utility is a measure of considered 
preference" (Gauthier, 19). Deliberative justification is not moral, because it is not other-
regarding. But morality is found within deliberative justification, and has the same 
function; it is a process by which we make choices and commit to actions. But unlike 
deliberative justification, moral justification is necessarily other-regarding, and places 
constraints on choices and actions. Gauthier's overall argument is that morality arises 
when, considering self-interested action, we begin to regard the actions of others.
What Gauthier has in mind is the fact that unconstrained deliberative justification 
often leads to intuitively bad results. "In many situations, if each person chooses what, 
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given the choices of the others, would maximize her expected utility, then the outcome 
would be mutually disadvantageous" (Gauthier, 22). We have already seen how 
unconstrained self-interested action led to the tragedy of the commons. But in these 
cases, the best possible results could be obtained if everyone cooperated. In these 
situations, "each person can see the benefit, to herself, of participating with her fellows in 
practices requiring each to refrain from the direct endeavor to maximize her own utility," 
(Gauthier, 23). These types of agreed upon-constraints form the basis of morality. 
Morality is the set of "constraints that would obtain agreement among rational persons 
who were choosing their terms of interaction" (Gauthier, 25).
Considering some of the objections to contractarianism will help further define the 
theory. The classic challenge to any contractarian theory of morality is how to answer the 
question of 'why be moral?' Agreements between individuals lead to mutual benefits, but 
in some cases, the mutual benefits are smaller than the benefits that could be obtained if 
the agent acted in a purely-self interested way. If we return to the example of the tragedy 
of the commons, we see that each shepherd would do moderately well if they mutually 
agree to constrain their behavior. But one shepherd could do best if everyone else 
constrained their behavior, and that one person maximized their sheep. Rational egoism 
seems to lead to the temptation to be non-cooperative, or to free-ride on the efforts of 
others. In “The Logic of Collective Action,” Mancur Olson argues that without some sort 
of pressure that encourages compliance, “rational, self-interested individuals will not act 
to achieve their common or group interests” (Olson, 2). On this subject, Elinor Ostrom 
wrote that at the heart of these kinds of problems is the free rider problem: “Whenever 
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one person cannot be excluded from the benefits that others provide, each person is 
motivated not to contribute to the joint effort, but to free-ride on the efforts of others. If 
all participants choose to free-ride, the collective benefit will not be produced. The 
temptation to free-ride, however, may dominate the decision process, and thus all will 
end up where no one wanted to be” (Ostrom, 6). 
Gauthier and Harman both have ways of responding to this challenge. Harman does 
not take it to be a serious challenge that we might make but not actually keep agreements. 
He writes "To agree in the relevant sense is not just to say something; it is to intend to do 
something, namely, to intend to carry out one's part of the agreement on the condition that 
others do their parts" (Harman, 15). If an agent agrees to constrain their behavior, but 
then acts in a way that is contrary to this agreement, Harman would say that this person 
never really intended to agree in the first place. Gauthier points out that anyone who fails 
to keep a moral agreement will be "excluded" from future participation in cooperative 
schemes, so it is really most rational that all agents make and keep agreements (Gauthier, 
25). Anyone who merely pretends to keep an agreement in order to achieve some 
strategic advantage would be excluded and possibly sanctioned for this kind of behavior. 
Further, the contractualist has a straightforward way of explaining the wrongness of this 
action: an action is wrong if it runs contrary to the shared agreement. Any act of non-
compliance is obviously wrong.
I think the most serious challenge to any contractarian thesis is that it seems that it 
cannot always explain why unjust societal institutions are wrong. The classic example of 
this is that of a society like the prewar American south in which slavery is a widely 
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accepted institution. The objection runs like this. In this society, there is an explicit moral 
agreement that certain humans are to be regarded as property, and bought and sold. So, 
acts of buying and selling human beings cannot be condemned, because they do not run 
against this agreement. In fact, they are perfectly consistent with this agreement. 
Harman's answer to this challenge is that moral systems are always driven towards 
consistency and a lack of arbitrary distinctions. We can judge the agreements that certain 
societies or groups come to because they do not cohere with facts about the world, or are 
based on arbitrary distinctions, and are therefore not general (Harman, 20). In the 
example of slavery, we could say that although the actions of slave owners are consistent 
with an agreement, the agreement itself is based on an arbitrary distinction between races 
of people. Gauthier's response is that, as self-interested rational egoists, each agent in a 
society has reason to ask whether or not there is some other agreement or set of 
agreements under which they could do better. It is clear that in the case of slavery, the 
slaves would do better under a set of moral agreements that did not include the agreement 
that certain human beings were property. Gauthier says this would lead to moral 
instability, and provides reason for the disadvantaged people to ask for a renegotiation of 
moral agreements (Gauthier, 27). 
I think this challenge to contractarianism is serious, but I think contractarians have a 
good way of addressing these problems. This is because rational egoism provides 
constant pressure for for tacit agreements to come to light, and for serious questioning 
about whether or not the agreements we have made are equitable and reasonable. 
Consider this example. Today, city planners share a tacit agreement that cities are 
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designed around personal automobile transportation. Harman argues that “someone may 
habitually act in accordance with the relevant understanding and therefore may be 
disposed to act in that way without having any more or less conscious intention" 
(Harman, 10). In this way, the city planners are acting in accordance with a shared tacit 
understanding that cars deserve primacy over pedestrians and other forms of 
transportation. When a large group of people acts in accordance with this tacit agreement, 
problems like smog and air pollution can be created. It seems that tacit agreements can 
lead to the creation of collective harms. However, rational egoism provides motivations 
to constantly revise our agreements. If it is the case that a standing agreement leads to 
collective harms, those harmed by that agreement have reason to ask for a renegotiation 
of that agreement.
Contractarianism is able to properly ground reasons why it is wrong to participate in 
collectively caused harms, or refrain from participating in collectively-caused benefits. I 
argue that contractarianism explains the wrongness of these actions in an intuitive way: it 
is because doing so runs against important social agreements. In cases where a social 
agreement leads to the creation of a collective harm, then, rational egoism and the desire 
to have a stable set of agreements puts pressure on revising these agreements. Once these 
agreements have been brought to light and restructured, we can condemn any action that 
fails to avoid causing this collective harm. In the case of providing collective benefits, the 
answer is simple: we have reason to participate in cooperative efforts to produce 
collective benefits when doing so can be agreed upon. If we agree that we ought to 
cooperate in order to solve some problem, such as world hunger, then any act that runs 
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counter to this agreement is wrong.
Why, then, should we agree to cooperative schemes such as ending world hunger in 
the first place? Why should we agree to not participate in activities that lead to collective 
harms? Agreeing to these types of behaviors often entails a significant change from the 
status quo for the agents involved, and these changes might come at significant costs. 
Despite these costs, I argue that we cannot refuse to form cooperative agreements of these 
types because we cannot justify our refusal to do so to those who would be affected by 
this agreement. For a further explanation of this position, we turn to another kind of 
contract theory.
T.M. Scanlon is the most well known proponent of the other major branch of 
contract ethics, which is referred to as 'contractualism' in order to distinguish it from 
contractarianism. Contractualists begin from a fundamentally different starting point than 
contractarians. Instead of supposing that everyone is primarily motivated by rational 
egoism, Scanlon bases his system on the motivating force of "the desire to be able to 
justify one's actions to others on grounds they could not reasonably reject" (Scanlon 
1982, 116). Fundamental to the idea that this is a morally motivating sentiment is the idea 
that other people are persons, and worthy of respect. This implies something like the idea 
that we may not use people as mere means. 
The central thesis of Scanlon's contractualism is that "an act is wrong if its 
performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any system of rules for the 
general regulation of behaviour which no one could reasonably reject as a basis for 
informed, unforced general agreement" (Scanlon 1982, 110). Scanlon's use of 'reasonably 
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reject' as opposed to 'rationally agree to' is a deliberate difference between his theory and 
contractarianism. For example, if we remember the heater case, it might be rational to 
ignore the government decree and use the extra heat, because it would provide a self-
interested sort of benefit to the Frenchman. However, it would not be reasonable of the 
Frenchman to ignore the harm he is doing to the national supply of fuel. In some cases, 
what it is rational to do is not the reasonable thing to do.
Of course, not every rejection of a principle will count as a reasonable one. For 
example, imagine that we are considering implementing a system for famine relief. Could 
anyone reasonably reject a principle that required people of moderate and high incomes 
to donate a small amount of money to a famine relief fund? We could imagine someone 
of moderate or high income attempting to reject this principle, but this rejection could not 
be reasonable. We would need to "consider the weightiness of the burdens it involves, for 
those on whom they fall, and the importance of the benefits it offers, for those who enjoy 
them" (Scanlon, 1998, 208). Nor could this rejection be justified to the people who would 
be affected by the principle, namely, those whose lives could be saved by the 
implementation of this principle. Under Scanlon's theory, “when we consider a principle, 
our attention is naturally directed first to those who would do worst under it. This is 
because if anyone has reasonable grounds for rejection, it is likely to be them” (Scanlon 
1982, 123; italics in original).
One of the other central features of Scanlon's argument is that when considering 
how a principle affects people, we consider only affects for individual people. He says 
that a central value of contractualist morality is "its insistence that the justifiability of a 
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moral principle depends only on various individuals' reasons for objecting to that 
principle and alternatives to it" (Scanlon 1998, 229). To illustrate the importance of 
taking this perspective, Scanlon creates an interesting case we can call the “world cup” 
case: “Suppose that Jones has suffered an accident in the transmitter room of a television 
station. Electrical equipment has fallen on his arm, and we cannot rescue him without 
turning off the transmitter for fifteen minutes. A world cup match is in progress, watched 
by many people, and it will not be over for an hour. Jones' injury will not get any worse if 
we wait, but his hand has been mashed and he is receiving extremely painful electric 
shocks. Should we rescue him now or wait until the match is over?" (Scanlon 1998, 235). 
In this case, there is a singular person who is suffering a great deal of harm. However, 
there is also a group of people enjoying the collectively-shared benefit of watching the 
world cup game. I have the intuition that we should rescue Jones, no matter how large the 
group of world-cup viewers is. 
This can be explained through Scanlon's individual perspective. Scanlon's 
individualist restriction forces us to compare the complaints6 of individuals in this 
scenario. On one side, we have one individual football-match-watcher, whose complaint 
is that rescuing Jones would mean missing a significant portion of a game he is enjoying. 
On the other, we have Jones, whose complaint is that he would be forced to endure 
torture only so that the football match would not be interrupted. In this case, it is easy to 
see that Jones' claim against torture is stronger than the claim that can be made by any 
individual match-watcher. Jones' claim is able to limit the weight of the collectively-
6 The idea  and terms of an 'individualist restriction' and the 'complaint model' of Scanlon's theory comes 
from Derek Parfit in Chapter 21 of Volume 2 of his book “On What Matters”
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shared benefit of watching the football match. Scanlon's individual perspective explains 
why, in some cases, we cannot be obligated to participate in the creation of collective 
benefits: we cannot be obliged to participate in the creation of collective benefits when 
doing so would require putting some great burden on someone else, such as Jones. In the 
same way, we cannot have a duty to refrain from participating in some collectively-
caused harm if doing so could be reasonably rejected. 
On Scanlon's view, individual agents can make reasonable rejections. This puts a 
limit on our participation, and refines moral agreements so that they do no serious harm. 
Under contractarianism, rational egoism supplies constant pressure to refine and revise 
our moral agreements. Contractualism defines another way these agreements can come 
under pressure: if any single person has a reasonable rejection to it. This pressure can be 
explained by applying Scanlon's theory to the case of air pollution in a commuter city. 
The current tacit agreement supports the fact that cars are the primary method of travel in 
the city. This agreement leads to air pollution and smog in the city. Scanlon's theory turns 
our attention to individuals affected by this agreement, perhaps those who have health 
issues do to the air quality.  Can a car commuter justify their action to a person who 
develops respiratory issues? I do not think so. We should seek an agreement which 
nobody could reasonably reject.
In general, contract theories have the most intuitive framework for understanding 
collective action problems. Under both main forms of contract theory, we can ground 
straightforward reasons why it is (usually) wrong to participate in a scheme that results in 
a collectively-produced harm. We can also ground straightforward reasons why it is 
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(usually) impermissible to refrain from participating in cooperative activities through 
which we could produce collective benefits. Scanlon's theory helps set limits on reasons 
for participating in these kinds of schemes by introducing the idea of reasonable 
rejection. I think there are a number of reasons these theories are successful. First, they 
are able to reach the above conclusion. But more importantly than that, they do so in the 
right way. They reach the above conclusions by appealing to intuitive ideas about why 
actions are wrong. Contract theories are a socially-based ethical theory, so it makes sense 
that they can be successfully applied to socially-based problems.
Compare contract theories to deontological ones. I argued that deontologists could 
not avoid the challenge posed by the excuse that “if everyone else is doing X, I have no 
duty to refrain from doing X.” I also argued that our obligations to collectivise and form 
group agents with others were defeated in cases where others refused to recognize the 
importance of an obligation or refused to collectivise in general. Contract theory provides 
a better framework for understanding this excuse. Let us return to Collin's drowning case. 
Imagine that you are one of the five people on the beach. If the others refuse to 
collectivise, we have a straightforward reason to condemn this action: refusing to 
participate in the saving of a drowning person runs against common social agreements 
like 'assist those in need, especially when this could be done at little cost.' Second, the 
acts of the non-collectivisers cannot be justified to the person who is drowning. In both 
contract theory and deontology, we reach the same conclusion; that the beachgoers who 
fail to collectivise do something wrong. But contract theories ground the wrongness of 
this failure in a way that is relative to the person who is drowning; not to an obligation.
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We can also compare contract theories to consequentialist ones. Consequentialists 
focus entirely on the consequences of an action, which is an intuitive way to ground the 
wrongness of participating in some collective scheme that produces bad consequences, 
such as pollution. I argued that deontology is not an intuitive solution, because it 
generally avoids a discussion of the consequences. Contract theories are not similarly 
oblivious to the consequences of actions. Instead, contract theories ground the importance 
of consequences in a meaningful way: consequences matter when they affect people we 
have moral agreements and understandings with. Then, consequences matter insofar as 
they violate or support these moral agreements. I argue that contract theory is able to 
maintain the intuitive connection between the wrongness of participating in certain 
collective actions and the consequences of those collective actions. For contract theorists, 
it is not just that consequences matter, it is that they matter to people.
Section 5: Conclusions
In this essay I have argued that in looking for ways to explain what is wrong with 
participating in a collective harm, or refusing to participate in a collective benefit, we 
should use a contractualist framework. I have also argued that consequentialist and 
deontological theories fail to provide consistent and plausible explanations. 
Consequentialist solutions of the moral-mathematics type proved to be a rabbit hole of 
moral mathematical solutions. Depending on the evaluative scale, depending on the 
principles in play, depending on the consequentialist tools used, the results could change. 
Further, the principles invoked to achieve these results were rarely justified in any way 
other than that they achieved the answer they were designed to find. Mostly, the focusing 
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on the consequences relevant to collective action problems does not seem to show the 
whole picture. Contract theories add to this picture by supposing that the consequences 
that affect people in collective-action situations can be evaluated not just for their 
content, but how they fit in to a larger picture that includes the relationships between the 
agents in the situation.
Deontological theories that include ideas about group agency do give a fairly 
plausible account of why it is wrong to participate in collective harms. The idea that there 
might be individual duties to be responsive to others with the idea that a collective could 
form in order to address some problem is a good way to explain a basic intuition in 
collective action cases. However, it is hard to overcome problems that stem from 
underlying principles in deontology, like 'ought implies can.' Second, Contractualism can 
also explain why we ought to be responsive to others in order to create collectives. 
I am not arguing that it is impossible for a consequentialist theory or 
deontological theory to ground strong reasons of the sort I am looking for. Some accounts 
are more plausible than others. Even some of the accounts which seem initially 
implausible could, with enough revision, be made to get the right answer. However, some 
of these revisions are ad-hoc, question begging, or otherwise unjustifiable. What I was 
seeking was the ethical framework which most straightforwardly and intuitively justified 
reasons to act in collective benefits, and reasons not to participate in collective harms. I 
believe I have argued that the contract framework is that framework. This is not to say 
that the contract framework is without problems. Initially, there are worries about the so-
called 'freerider' problem, and there are worries about justice and fairness in making 
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agreements. However, I think that contract theories are able to respond to these 
challenges in a way that supports the conclusion that we can ground reasons of the kind I 
am looking for.
I conclude that the contract framework is the best ethical model to use in 
explaining what is wrong about collective action problems. I have been arguing in favor 
of the intuition that there is something wrong about participating in a scheme which 
collectively creates a harm, even if the individual acts do not seem to be moral wrongs. I 
have also argued that there is something wrong about refraining from participating in 
schemes where, if enough people participated, some important benefit could be 
collectively-produced. We should move away from explaining these intuitions in terms of 
moral mathematics or objective obligations. Instead, we should favor theories that 
capture these intuitions in terms of social arrangements and what we can justify to others.
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